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Abstract
In this paper, we estimate credit demand for potential Irish first time buyer
households currently living in the rental sector. Exploiting individual survey re-
sponses to credit demand questions, and characteristics of the household, we es-
timate the level of latent credit demand that could be serviced by the market given
prudent credit risk assessment and the current regulatory environment. We then
compare this demand to current market provision to explore whether a credit gap
exists. We find evidence of excess demand for credit and an under-supply of loans
relative to latent demand. In terms of credit access issues, we find that insuffi-
cient savings for a down-payment, rather than income or affordability, is the most
binding constraint. Scenario analysis suggests between 2,000 and 9,000 additional
loans could be provided per annum depending on the degree to which demand is
realised. This would imply an additional e0.4bn to e1.9bn in lending. We show a
targeted public mortgage credit instrument could alleviate a portion of this gap and
aid market access by providing between 1,100 and 5,800 loans at between e0.2bn
to e1bn approximately.
Keywords:Access to credit; macroprudential; mortgages
JEL Classification: R21; G21; R31; R38
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1 Introduction
1Access to mortgage credit for first time buyer households has been a topic of consid-
erable focus for both policy makers and researchers. Much of the general literature
on credit markets has attempted to explore the extent to which such markets fail and
how public policy can be used to address these market failures. Commonly discussed
market failures in this regard are credit rationing on loan volumes or prices due to
asymmetric information, moral hazard or adverse selection. Recently the literature has
also emphasised borrower discouragement as a demand-side market failure. The onset
of the financial crisis, the subsequent tightening of credit supply by the banking sec-
tor, and the regulatory moves to introduce macroprudential regulations in mortgage
markets have all led to some households being unable to access sufficient credit to pur-
chase a home. This has refocused attention on how best to ensure an adequate supply
of credit to first time home-buyers internationally (Whitehead and Williams, 2017).
In an Irish context, the severe banking crisis caused a significant and protracted con-
traction in credit supply with overall new lending activity falling rapidly between 2009
and 2013. Over this period banks considerably tightened lending standards (in terms
of the loan-to-income ratio (LTI), loan-to-value ratio (LTV), mortgage term and other
credit risk characteristics). This was welcome given the imprudent nature of lending
that took place at very loose credit conditions (McCarthy and McQuinn, 2017) during
the Irish credit boom. However, given these developments, the structure of the mort-
gage market has changed such that few households at the lower end of the income
distribution receive mortgage credit (Lydon and McCann, 2017) relative to pre 2008
levels. Furthermore, the welcomed introduction of macroprudential regulations by the
Central Bank of Ireland in 2015, which set the maximum allowable LTI and LTV of
newly originated mortgages, has restricted the allowable credit terms for households.
Coupled with the shortage of housing supply, the consequence of this shortage in credit
has been a considerable shift towards rented accommodation and rapidly rising rental
prices.
Such changes to the structure of the market have led to questions about whether
the current lending environment is optimal, or whether a supply-side lending inter-
vention may be required to ease credit access conditions for first-time-home-buyers on
the margins. To investigate whether there is a rationale for such an intervention re-
quires a demonstration that this group is under-served by the market at present, and
a clear identification of how any intervention instrument could help to alleviate credit
access issues.
To explore these concepts, in this paper, we use two separate micro-datasets to
1Results presented in this paper are based on analysis of strictly controlled Research Microdata Files
provided by the Central Statistics Office (CSO). The CSO does not take any responsibility for the views
expressed or the outputs generated from this research.
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provide a partial equilibrium estimate of latent credit demand and the credit gap for
Irish first time buyer households using a static microsimulation approach. We put for-
ward a concept of bankable credit demand which is the total level of credit demand
amongst Irish households given prudent credit risk assessment and the current regulat-
ory environment. Exploiting individual survey responses to credit demand questions,
and characteristics of the household, we estimate the level of latent bankable credit
demand for Ireland over the period 2016-2017.2 We then explore the degree to which
policy could help to improve credit access by addressing the market failures and servi-
cing some of the latent credit demand. In particular we focus on direct public mortgage
provision as an instrument.
Our micro-founded empirical approach is as follows. We match new survey data on
the share of households with a demand for home-ownership with a nationally repres-
entative survey of income and living conditions, the Irish Survey of Income and Living
Conditions (SILC) dataset. Using this matched dataset, we approximate the level of lat-
ent bankable credit demand in the economy by excluding households that are deemed
to be of high credit risk or their circumstances do not allow them to purchase a prop-
erty in the county they are currently living (insufficient gross income, savings or net
monthly income left after housing costs).
More specifically, we use the households’ individual income and wealth data to
approximate how much they could afford to pay for a house given prevailing mac-
roprudential regulatory conditions. Following Kelly et al. (2018), our method calcu-
lates three potential house prices that a household could obtain given their savings,
gross income and net monthly after tax income. In a sense, this estimates the share of
households which have sufficient income, wealth and after tax income to transact in
the market. If the lowest of these house prices is above the 25th percentile of the actual
transacted house price distribution in their county, they are deemed bankable demand.
We can then use this framework to calculate how many rental households with a de-
mand for mortgage credit could conceivably be able to borrow to purchase a home. We
can also value the demand as each household has an individual specific loan that is
associated with their hypothetical purchase.
A number of findings emerge. First, we estimate 18 per cent of households in the
rental sector who wish to purchase a home could obtain a mortgage given the prevail-
ing conditions. As a share of the overall rental sector, this equates to approximately
7 per cent in total.3 Using our microsimulation model with population weights, we
estimate that this equates to approximately 38,000 loans which far exceeds the annual
level of mortgage approvals at present. However, it is not likely that all of this demand
would come on stream at one point in time. We therefore undertake a scenario analysis
2This time frame is data driven.
3As 38% of the rental sector have current home-ownership demand, then 18% of 38% is approximately
7%.
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which varies the “demand flow rate” or the level of demand that could conceivably be
realised in any one year period. These findings suggest that between 2,000 and 9,000
new loans could be approved at a value of between e0.4 bn and e1.9bn. This is evid-
ence of a considerable excess latent demand for credit relative to the actual level of
credit supplied in the Irish market. In our assessment, we do not make any assump-
tions around whether or not these under-served households would actually be able to
find a property and transact in the current market. This would require a search model
and is outside the scope of our analysis.
While it is not the objective of this paper to measure the degree of credit supply in
the market, nor the reasons determining bank lending activity, it is useful at this junc-
ture to explore some tentative reasons why the banking sector may be under-providing
credit, over and above the macroprudential limits. McCoy and Wachter (2017) note the im-
portance of cyclicality for credit access. Given the size of the shock faced by the banking
sector during the financial crisis, risk attitudes and risk tolerances on the supply-side
would inevitably tighten post crisis. In this context of a contraction in credit, credit-
worthy but marginal cases may be rejected that otherwise would have been accepted
under alternative risk contexts. This may explain a portion of the rejection rate. Indeed,
the rejection rate of applicants in our ESM sample is one-in-three for renters. Second,
the interest rate in Ireland is high by international standards with the reduction in com-
petition that has occurred in the Irish market cited as an explanatory factor4. If the
interest rate is higher than would be expected in a competitive market, borrowers are
going to fail stress tests as a consequence. However, a lower rate may not improve
affordability, if it causes house prices to rise.
Another likely reason for the lower levels of latent demand is borrower discour-
agement; households are not coming forward to apply as they feel they are likely to be
rejected. While some of these borrowers are likely correct to self ration, there are a por-
tion that are not and these borrowers are included in our estimate of bankable demand.
Our ESM survey shows that the share of discouraged borrowers is much higher than
the share of rejections. This is unsurprising given recent research on the uncertainty ef-
fecting households credit access under macroprudential (Economides et al., 2019) and
challenges around housing affordability more broadly for rental households (Corrigan,
Foley, McQuinn, O’Toole and Slaymaker, 2019).
A final group of factors to explain the extent of unmet latent demand are non-credit
market frictions such as search frictions or low supply. For example, if information or
search frictions are lowering the transaction rate, this would have an impact on lat-
ent demand. Cases such as this may include where households just cannot find the
4There are also other factors involved including the recoverability of collateral, the higher ar-
rears rate and the banks cost of funds. These are outlined in a CBI report entitled "Influences
on Standard Variable Rate Pricing in Ireland" available at: https://www.centralbank.ie/docs/default-
source/publications/correspondence/finance-reports/influences-on-svr-pricing-in-ireland.pdf?sfvrsn=2
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right property in the area they would like to live. Extensively searching for properties
has a cost threshold that some households with demand may be unwilling to cover at
present.
Given our demonstration of a credit gap, we test whether a targeted public mort-
gage credit instrument could alleviate a portion of this gap and aid market access.
By deploying the conditions of the existing Rebuilding Ireland Home Loan, which is
provided by the Irish government and was introduced in February 2018, we estimate
that demand for the scheme could be between 1,100 and 5,600 loans at a value of ap-
proximately e0.2bn to e0.9bn. As a benchmark to our findings from the microsimula-
tion, data on applications to the RIHL scheme have approximated a total of 5400 since
inception with over 1000 loans drawn down to June 20195. This suggests our model
provides a reasonable approximation of the actual level of demand.
A note of caution on our findings must be presented. Our estimates provide a par-
tial equilibrium estimate of credit demand and do not consider any impacts on the
market or macroeconomy of meeting the estimated credit gap. Expanding the level
of lending to serve the excess demand through the market or by policy mechanisms
would naturally be expected to have an impact on house prices that would be relat-
ive to the change in credit. Indeed, given the low level of housing supply in Ireland
at present, and the high level of fundamental demographic demand that has been un-
met over the past decade, it is likely that any considerable increases in credit which
boost demand, would put upward pressure on prices. Previous studies have indicated
a house price elasticity of credit between 0.15 and 0.2 (Favara and Imbs, 2015; Kelly
et al., 2018), suggesting a high pass through to prices of expanding credit. This would
occur as the housing demand curve would shift out, and given the inelastic nature of
housing supply in the short run, prices would inevitably rise. These dynamics suggest
that any public intervention should be limited in size and scope relative to the overall
size of first time buyer lending so as to avoid fuelling credit-house price spirals. Future
research should extend the current framework to examine the house price elasticity of
credit.
A number of caveats must be noted to our microsimulation approach. Naturally,
with these type of models, a range of assumptions have to be made in terms of the
parameterisation of the inputs. This is particularly the case given we are matching
two micro datasets and estimating wealth levels. Any changes to the input parameters
could change our estimates notably, including the aggregations and the assumptions
around the demand flow rate. To test the sensitivity of our estimates to these inputs we
present a range of robustness checks which alter a number of the key parameters. While
the levels adjust in these scenarios, the main finding of a significant credit gap remains.
Furthermore, for some of our analysis, the number of data observations is quite low
5See O’Toole and Slaymaker (forthcoming) for more details on the data covering RIHL.
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which means the estimates are even more volatile to changes in the parameters.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of
credit demand and access from a conceptual perspective. Section 3 presents the main
empirical estimates and Section 4 examines the sensitivity of these estimates. Section 5
looks at the policy intervention, while Section 6 concludes.
2 Understanding Credit Demand and Credit Access Across House-
holds
2.1 Credit Demand and Credit Rationing: An Overview
To begin our discussion of household credit access, it is useful to sketch out a concep-
tual framework for thinking about the latent demand for credit, the degree of credit
constraints as well as scoping out where public intervention may be required in credit
markets. First, we characterise all households using an overview diagram to depict ac-
cess to credit across all households similar to that used in Freel et al. (2012) for small
enterprises. This is presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Overview of Household Credit Access
All Households
Did Not Apply for Credit






Households can be separated into those who apply for credit to formal financial
institutions and those who do not apply. Of those households who don’t apply, a pro-
portion of them have no credit demand. A second group of these households do have
credit demand but are discouraged from applying as discussed above. For those house-
holds that applied for credit, a percentage of households are rejected following bank
underwriting and assessment of the application and the remainder are successful and
receive credit.
The critical question from a policy perspective is whether market failures exist and
thus whether there is a basis for efficiency enhancing state intervention in this market.
In their seminal work, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) define credit rationing as a situation
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where either identical borrowers may receive different credit outcomes, or where some
borrowers are simply not able to access finance at any interest rate. Broadly speak-
ing, the justification for intervention in the housing credit market can be split into two
groups: those on the grounds of economic efficiency from correcting market failures,
and those on the grounds of equity and fairness. We will discuss each of the reasons for
credit market failures and the potential grounds for intervention in turn.
First, potential borrowers may find themselves unable to access credit due to in-
formational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders. This can occur when a lender
does not know how good a borrower is from their observable information. For instance,
when a borrower knows more than the lender about their individual circumstances
which may affect their future ability to make repayments, such as information on their
medical status or the security of their employment. In addition, the borrowers’ risk
profile may also be unobservable to the lender. Lenders factor in the probability that
not all loans will be repaid when pricing the cost of a loan. They therefore include a risk
premium, which raises the interest rate. However, offering a higher interest rate to ac-
count for the fact that some loans will not be repaid results in the lowest risk borrowers
dropping out, leaving a higher proportion of poor quality/higher risk borrowers in the
pool of potential borrowers. This therefore increases the likelihood of a poor quality or
riskier borrower obtaining credit.
A third reason for credit market failure relates to moral hazard or agency problems.
Put simply, the lender wants to maximise the likelihood that the loan will be repaid,
while the incentives of the borrower may not be aligned with this. All three of these
issues arise due to imperfect information and the costs of overcoming these information
barriers may be high both in terms of monetary and time costs. This can result in
an economically inefficient situation if credit worthy borrowers are not able to access
the credit they require and could use productively. furthermore, the recent literature
on household credit access has highlighted income and wealth constraints whereby
households may meet credit risk standards but have insufficient income or savings to
make a purchase (Barakova et al., 2014).
Credit rationing, that is, excess demand for loanable funds, has been the subject
of considerable economic research, including the seminal paper by Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981) which identified the potential existence of non-market-clearing equilibria in credit
markets. Prices, that is interest rates, need not necessarily clear markets as the interest
rate a bank charges may affect the riskiness of the pool of loans managed by the bank;
as interest rates increase the quality of the loan portfolio may decrease6. It is, however
important to note that much of the literature concerning credit rationing is in relation
to credit as an input in circumstances in which rationed credit may impair economic
6In practice, however, Irish banks are not unconstrained when setting interest rates which are a product
of many variables including funding costs, operating costs, bad debt charges, return on capital and com-
petition (Department of Finance, 2019)
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growth by inhibiting productivity growth among firms. As such, credit rationing re-
duces society’s welfare below its non-credit rationed potential. The role of credit as a
means to achieve home-ownership is not, perhaps, as straightforward and it certainly
seems unlikely that the satisfaction of all demand for mortgage credit would be welfare
maximising. The exact quantum of socially optimal home purchase credit would be
very difficult to quantify, however, there are economic arguments in favour of home-
ownership in general and in favour of making home-ownership accessible to a wider
pool of households than might otherwise be the case. The question of the ideal propor-
tion of households that should be homeowners and whether public policy should aim
to reverse the tenure shift observed in recent decades is complex and goes beyond the
scope of this paper.
Kon and Storey (2003) highlight a demand side market failure by which borrowers
are discouraged from applying for credit due to a belief that loans will be unsuccess-
ful; the prevailing literature now treats such borrowers as under-served by the credit
market and therefore credit constrained7.
In addition to intervention on the grounds of economic efficiency and market fail-
ure, there is an argument for State intervention in terms of social fairness and equity,
as well as due to the positive externalities associated with home-ownership. Housing
is a major source through which households accumulate wealth. Di et al. (2007) show
that even after controlling for initial wealth levels and personal characteristics likely
to affect wealth accumulation such as previous savings habits, home-ownership had a
positive effect on the net wealth of households. If certain sections of society are unable
to own a property, this has major implications for the distribution of wealth within soci-
ety. Indeed, Acolin and Wachter (2017) discuss how home-ownership can help to enable
intergenerational economic mobility. Furthermore, there is some evidence that home-
ownership is associated with a range of positive externalities. For instance, there is
evidence that parental home-ownership is positively associated with successful youth
outcomes, both in terms of educational attainment, being less likely to engage in crime
Blau et al. (2019), and earnings in later life (Boehm and Schlottmann, 1999); although it
is not clear that this is a causal relationship.
Given our overview of the market presented in Figure 1, the focus of where these
market failures may lie is in both the discouraged borrower group as well as in the
rejected group. For discouraged borrowers, the focus is on whether a proportion of
discouraged borrowers would be successful if they were to apply for credit. For the
rejected borrowers, the question arises as to whether such borrowers were fairly or
unfairly rejected by the market. Finally, considering loan pricing, if interest rates are
not being set on a competitive market basis, and this causes either heightened rejection
7That is not to say all such borrowers should receive credit as a proportion are potentially excluding
themselves with good reason, as they would be rejected if they applied. See Ferrando and Mulier (2015)
for further discussion in an SME context.
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or higher discouragement, then this is also a form of market failure.
2.2 A Conceptual Framework for Measuring the Credit Gap
We now present a more structured framework for measuring credit demand and credit
access in the mortgage market. This is not to be taken for a full model of the credit
market, it is purely a descriptive overview of the main channels through which the
credit market operates. Let us define the underlying latent demand for mortgage credit









where N is the total number of households with positive latent demand for credit. For
each household, the loan amount that they desire Li will be a function of the following
characteristics:
Li = f (Wi, HPi, Yi, r) (2)
where Wi is household wealth, HPi is the price of the house they desire to purchase,
Yi is household income and r is the market interest rate.
However, not all of the underlying latent credit demand is “bankable” in the sense
that there are some borrowers who should not receive credit under any prudent credit
assessment. To elaborate, it would not be an efficient allocation of credit in the economy
to provide mortgages to households with an elevated default risk, for example, house-
holds which are unemployed, those with repayment difficulties on their rent, utilities
or other debts, or those who find their existing debts to be a burden. For these house-
holds, an alternative to mortgaged home-ownership would be a more suitable tenure.
In assessing any optimal provision of credit in an economy, we posit to exclude the
credit demand for these high credit risk households from the latent demand.
Furthermore, since the onset of the financial crisis, regulatory authorities globally
have introduced a range of macroprudential limits on borrower leverage. The aim of
these measures is to boost systemic resilience to financial or economic shocks. These
regulatory restrictions must also be incorporated into the reduction in bankable de-
mand as it is not possible for the banking sector to supply those households if circum-
stances do not allow them to meet the regulations. In Ireland, these regulations include
a 3.5 loan-to-income ratio and a 90 per cent maximum loan-to-value ratio for first time
buyers (Kinghan, 2018). Some exemptions to the regulations are also available8.
Let us define bankable credit demand, BC∗ as follows:
8The following exemptions are permitted: up to 5 per cent of the value of new FTB lending may exceed
the 90 per cent LTV limit and up to 20 per cent of the value of new FTB lending is allowed above the 3.5
times gross income LTI limit.
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1 if CR∗i ≥ δ;
0 if CR∗i < δ.
(4)
where δ is a default risk above which it is imprudent to lend from an idiosyncratic
risk perspective and CR∗i is the underlying latent credit risk of household i. Ensuring
safe lending and proper underwriting is a clear lesson from the global financial crisis
which had many of its roots in unsafe mortgage lending practices (Anderson et al.
(2011); Jiang et al. (2013); Jiang et al. (2014)). The following identity depicts which
households are unable to enter the market as their circumstances do not allow them to
pass the regulatory tests:
MPi =
{
1 if household i complies with MP ;
0 if household i does not comply with MP .
(5)
In a sense, what identity 3 provides is the latent credit demand that could be sati-
ated by the market if reasonable credit risk standards were deployed and the current
regulations were complied with.
The extent to which bankable demand is met in an economy is determined by both
demand and supply side factors and the degree to which the market is in equilibrium.
We can use a traditional disequilibrium model of credit demand and supply to illus-









Credit supply is a function of the loan-to-value ratio, the loan-to-income ratio, the
term available to the borrower, the market interest rate r, other characteristics Xb of
the banks that affect lending (such as capital ratios, funding structures etc.), their own
credit risk standards which will be some function of δ the underlying latent credit risk,
and an assessment of affordability in terms of the ability of the household to meet a
stressed mortgage payment, ps, normalised by their income Yi.
In a mortgage market with a macroprudential framework limiting credit conditions,
it is possible that the loan-to-value (LTV) and loan-to-income (LTI) supply conditions
will be set by the regulatory authority as noted above, thus putting a regulatory ceiling
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on the borrowing capacity. Furthermore, legislation can also determine the condition
for the stressed payment, as is the case for Ireland. In a sense, credit supply will there-
fore be an interaction between bank lending practices and the regulatory environment.
The observed level of lending in the economy will therefore be:
C = min (BC∗, Cs) (7)
In periods of excess demand for credit, Cs = Ca and the credit gap will be:
GAP = BC∗ − Ca (8)
For periods in which credit supplied outweighs credit demand, this “gap” will be
negative.




Latent Credit Demand = C∗
Credit Gap Received Credit
Bankable Credit Demand
Figure 2 provides a graphical depiction of the measurement of credit demand and
the credit gap suggested by this framework. Total latent credit demand can be split
into bankable demand and two separate groups of non-bankable demand: those who
are inherently high credit risk and those who are constrained by macroprudential reg-
ulations. Of the potentially bankable demand, a certain proportion will receive credit,
while the remaining portion will be unserviced. In this illustrative framework, there is
no distinction between discouraged borrowers and credit rationed households as both
of these are included in the measure of the gap as households who have a demand for
credit that is under-served by the market at present.
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3 Measuring Latent Credit Demand and the Credit Gap
In this section we build on the conceptual framework of credit demand outlined in
Section 2.2 in order to examine the level of mortgage credit demand and the extent to
which access to credit is an issue among potential first time buyers (FTB) in Ireland.
Combining data from two household micro-datasets enables us to first estimate the
level of mortgage demand before then separating households into those who are high
credit risk and those who face insufficient wealth or income and also those households
unable to meet credit stress tests. This provides us with an estimate of bankable credit
demand as outlined in the above framework. We can then measure whether the market
is currently servicing the estimated level of latent credit demand.
3.1 Measuring Mortgage and Homeownership Demand
In order to examine the level of mortgage credit demand among Irish households, we
exploit data from the ESRI’s Economic Sentiment Monitor Survey (ESM). The ESM is
a nationally representative study surveying approximately 800 households per month
on a variety of topics ranging from views on the economy as a whole to savings and
investments behaviour and the housing market, in addition to a set of socio-economic
variables. Importantly for our purposes, since 2018 the survey has also contained a
series of questions related to mortgage credit. Specifically, we make use of information
on households’ desire to enter the home-ownership market, whether they have applied
for mortgage finance or whether they feel discouraged from doing so.
Our sample period runs from January 2018 to February 2019 and as our focus is
on those households looking to enter the home-ownership market for the first time,
we limit our sample to those living in either the private rental sector, local authority
or housing association rented property, or rent free9. This leaves us with a sample
of 1,228 households. In Table 1 we present summary statistics on the composition of
the sample. Unsurprisingly, more than half of our sample are aged 18-35, while half
have third level education and just under half live in the Greater Dublin Area (GDA).10
Regarding household composition, 80 per cent of households comprise more than one
adult, but just under 40 per cent contain any dependent children.
Turning now to the demand for mortgage credit, we classify a household as having
a demand for credit if they satisfy at least one of the following criteria: (i) they have
9While it is common in other analysis of potential FTBs to impose an age restriction on households, in
this work we take the view that all households who do not own a property are potential home-owners.
This approach is consistent with the Rebuilding Ireland Home Loan eligibility criteria which states that ap-
plicants must be aged between 18-70. In practice, we then limit a household’s ability to obtain a mortgage
by altering the maximum mortgage term according to their age. We discuss this further in Section 3.2.2
10This share is consistent with the data from the Residential Tenancies Board new registrations inform-
ation available in their Quarterly Rent indices.
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Table 1. Sample Composition Summary Statistics






Third level educ. 48.51
Prim./Sec. educ. 51.49
Household Composition
1 Adult Hhold 18.14
2+ Adults Hhold 81.86
Dependents
1+ children aged <18 38.53
Employment Status
Employee - Public sector 15.76
Employee - Private sector 38.08












Don’t save regularly 49.15




applied for a mortgage within the last six months; (ii) they did not apply for a mortgage
as they feared their application would be unsuccessful i.e. discouraged borrowers; (iii)
they intend to buy or build a property within the next two years. From the first row of
Table 2 we see that 38 per cent of the households in our sample have credit demand;
this can be thought of as the underlying latent demand for mortgage credit in the Irish
economy.
Regarding heterogeneity, as we might expect, the desire to obtain credit and enter
the home-ownership market is strongest amongst those households who we might
deem as the most prepared to do so: those in employment, two adult households, those
who regularly put money into a savings account and households easily able to make
ends meet. With regards to age we see a higher demand amongst the younger house-
holds in our sample (aged 18-35) and a much lower demand for credit amongst those
over 50. This is unsurprising as we would expect many younger households to live in
the rental sector before transitioning into home-ownership, whereas those older house-
holds who remain in rental accommodation will have more limited opportunities to do
14
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The figures represent the percentage of households within each socio-economic characteristic group
who have a demand for mortgage credit.
so. Regarding rental tenure, roughly half of those in the private rental sector expressed
a demand for mortgage credit, with a much lower figure of 16 per cent for those living
in local authority or housing association accommodation.
Table 3. Characterisation of Mortgage Demand and Credit Constrained - Summary Statistics
Latent Mortgage Applied Discouraged
Credit Demand Borrowers
% 38.37 7.10 15.68
No. Obs. 1,228 1,228 1,228
Latent mortgage credit demand includes households who expressed an intent to buy or build a house
within the next two years plus those who have already applied for credit in the past 6 months and
those who considered applying for a mortgage in the past 6 months but did not apply or those who
responded that they did not apply because they expected to be unsuccessful (discouraged borrowers).
In Table 3 we see that while 38 per cent of the sample expressed an underlying
demand for credit, approximately only one fifth of those households, or 7 per cent of
our entire sample, actually applied for mortgage credit in the last six months. In fact,
roughly double this number, 15 per cent of households, explicitly say that they were
discouraged from applying as they expected their application to be unsuccessful.
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Table 4. Determinants of Mortgage Credit Demand - Probit Regressions
(1) (2) (3)
Latent Mortgage Applied Discouraged
Credit Demand Borrowers
Aged 36-50 -0.0114 0.0484** -0.0393
(0.0374) (0.0213) (0.0264)
Aged > 50 -0.0512 0.000135 0.00258
(0.0451) (0.0265) (0.0348)
2+ Adults 0.0765* 0.0441** 0.0229
(0.0399) (0.0183) (0.0273)
Third level educ. 0.0601 0.0350** 0.00748
(0.0367) (0.0169) (0.0290)
1+ Dependents 0.0999*** 0.0559*** 0.0359
(0.0345) (0.0209) (0.0288)
GDA 0.0524 0.00488 0.0448*
(0.0319) (0.0166) (0.0255)
Self-employed -0.0310 -0.0131 -0.0741**
(0.0625) (0.0247) (0.0344)
Unemployed/Inactive -0.166*** -0.0335* -0.0408
(0.0391) (0.0194) (0.0306)
Save regularly 0.0665** 0.0605*** 0.00117
(0.0336) (0.0156) (0.0264)
Easily make ends meet 0.0703** 0.0264 -0.0798***
(0.0342) (0.0167) (0.0266)
Private renter 0.216*** 0.0732*** 0.121***
(0.0422) (0.0143) (0.0268)
Rent free 0.146** 0.0626** 0.0874**
(0.0570) (0.0272) (0.0443)
Observations 1,228 1,228 1,228
Dependent variables are (1) =1 if household has latent mortgage credit demand; (2) =1 if household has
applied for mortgage credit in last 6 months; and (3) =1 if household did not apply for mortgage credit
due to being discouraged. Base categories are: 1 adult household; primary/secondary education; no
dependents; non-Greater Dublin Area; employee; does not regularly save income; difficulty making
ends meet; local authority/housing association renter.
Further to the descriptive statistics presented in Table 2, we now examine the de-
terminants of demand for mortgage credit more formally. We estimate a simple probit
model of the determinants of mortgage credit demand (Dit = 1):
Pr(Dit = 1) = f (Xit, Ecit) (9)
where Xit is a vector of standard household characteristics likely to affect demand
including age, household composition, whether there are dependent children in the
household, education, tenure and whether the household lives in the GDA. Ecit is a
vector of household economic status variables including the employment status, house-
hold saving behaviour and their ability to make ends meet. The results from this estim-
ation are presented in column 1 of Table 4.
We see that the economic status variables are highly statistically significant determ-
inants of whether a household has a demand for mortgage credit. Unsurprisingly the
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unemployed and inactive have a lower demand relative to those in employment, while
those regularly able to save their income and those who are easily able to make ends
meet have a higher demand for credit. Those living in the private rental sector and rent
free have higher demand relative to those in local authority accommodation. Those
with children also have higher levels of demand for credit. We find that age, education
and whether the household lives in the GDA are not statistically significant determin-
ants of credit demand. We also report the results from estimating the determinants of
credit application and of being a discouraged borrower in columns 2 and 3 of Table 4
respectively. While age and education had no significant effect on the latent demand for
credit, we do see that those with third level education are more likely to have applied
for credit, as are those aged 36-50 relative to younger households.
3.2 Towards an Estimate of Bankable Demand
3.2.1 Matching the ESM to the EU SILC
Using the ESM dataset enabled us to obtain a clear picture of both the level and key de-
terminants of mortgage finance demand among potential first time buyers in the Irish
housing market in Section 3.1. However, as discussed in Section 2.2, not all of this lat-
ent demand for credit should be serviced; high credit risk potential borrowers should
not receive credit under a prudent credit assessment, while others will be constrained
by current macroprudential regulations. There is widespread evidence that the scale
of the default crisis which began in 2008 was exacerbated by the poor quality of un-
derwriting practices at the point of loan origination (Anderson et al. (2011); Jiang et al.
(2013); Jiang et al. (2014)), which resulted in non-credit worthy borrowers obtaining
mortgage finance. For Ireland McCarthy and McQuinn (2017) document the loosening
of credit underwriting standards. The scale of mortgage defaults and the global finan-
cial crisis that followed highlighted the importance of adequately assessing the credit
risk of potential borrowers.
One limitation of the ESM survey is that it does not contain sufficient information,
particularly regarding income, other loans and payment histories, to enable us to per-
form a credit risk assessment of households. We therefore utilise a second dataset, the
CSO’s Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC). SILC is a nationally repres-
entative household survey which also incorporates an individual level questionnaire.
The survey contains a wealth of information including household income, rental pay-
ments, current employment status and whether an individual has had any recent spells
of unemployment. Furthermore, the survey collects information on a number of other
indicators regarding a household’s potential level of credit risk, such as whether they
have been in arrears on rental, utility and other loan payments in the last twelve months
and whether they have any existing debt which they perceive to be a burden. Matching
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data on underlying mortgage credit demand from the ESM survey with the SILC data
allows us to estimate the level of bankable credit demand of first time buyers in the
Irish economy.
We limit our sample in SILC to households currently in the private rental or local
authority rental sectors, as well as those living rent free or paying a below market price
rent and we pool data from the two most recent waves, 2016 and 2017. As SILC does
not contain information on households’ demand for credit, we utilise our findings from
the ESM survey. Specifically, we use the β coefficients from the model of mortgage de-
mand estimated in column 1 of Table 4 to predict the probability of each household in
SILC having a demand for mortgage financing. This ensures that households possess-
ing the characteristics that were determined to be key drivers of mortgage demand in
the ESM survey receive a higher predicted probability of having demand for mortgage
credit in our SILC data. From Table 3 we know that 38 per cent of potential first time
buyer households had a demand for mortgage credit, so we then rank households in
SILC according to their probability of having mortgage demand. Our final sample con-
tains the 38 per cent of households with the highest predicted probability of mortgage
demand. Crucially, having combined the two datasets, the income data in SILC, in ad-
dition to questions on rent and other loan arrears and the burden of current debt allows
us to assess the credit risk of these households, which is a critically important aspect
for determining whether the household should be able to access mortgage financing.
In Table 5 we present a comparison of the summary statistics of the ESM and SILC
samples. These samples contain households who expressed a demand for mortgage
credit (ESM) and those in SILC who we have determined as having a demand for mort-
gage credit following the method outlined above. The first thing to consider when
combining two datasets is whether the compositions of the samples are similar. One of
the principal motives for combining the ESM and SILC survey data was to enable us to
credit risk assess households, for which the income data in SILC is crucial. It is there-
fore particularly reassuring that the two samples are very closely matched on two key
variables which we would expect to determine income: employment status and educa-
tion. The samples are also well matched in terms of household composition, mean age
and the proportion living in the GDA. The proportion of households with dependents
in SILC is somewhat higher, while the proportion in local authority rental accommod-
ation is lower in SILC than in the ESM sample. Nevertheless, we are satisfied that the
samples are similar on key characteristics to justify combining them in this way.
Having established the set of households in our SILC sample with an underlying
demand for mortgage credit, we now examine the extent to which these households are
(i) high credit risk and (ii) the extent to which they have insufficient gross or net income
or savings to enter the housing market due to the current regulatory environment. This
will then provide us with a level of bankable mortgage demand in the Irish economy.
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Table 5. Comparison of ESM and SILC Sample Composition Summary Statistics
ESM SILC
Age
Mean Age 34.73 36.53
Education
Third level educ. 63.28 64.07
Prim./Sec. educ. 36.72 35.93
Household Composition
1 Adult Hhold 11.25 14.42
2+ Adults Hhold 88.75 85.58
Dependents






LA/Housing Assoc. renter 13.14 5.51
Private renter 73.72 80.31




Save regularly 60.16 51.64
Don’t save regularly 39.84 48.36
Obs. 458 897
Notes: For the ESM sample we present the summary statistics for those households that have a de-
mand for mortgage credit. For the SILC sample we present the summary statistics for those house-
holds that we have determined have mortgage credit demand.
3.2.2 Measuring the Credit Risk Component
As previously discussed in Section 2.2, not all of the underlying demand for credit
should be serviced as some potential borrowers are simply too high credit risk and
should therefore not receive credit under a prudent credit assessment. In practice
lenders use a variety of factors to determine a household’s level of credit risk. In the
US for example, Acolin et al. (2016) identify a household’s credit score as an important
factor which constrains access to mortgage credit. Irish households are not assessed
according to a single credit score, such as the FICO score in the US. Nevertheless, Ir-
ish mortgage providers do perform credit record checks with the Irish Credit Bureau,
as well as requesting information on employment status, income, age, outgoings, sav-
ings and outstanding loans in order to determine whether an application for credit is
successful. The new Central Credit Registry will also provide good information going
forward.
We use a number of indicators in SILC to determine whether a household is high
credit risk. Regarding employment status, we mark a household as high credit risk if
the head of household has had any spells of unemployment in the previous 12 months
or if they are inactive in the labour market. While we do not have information on the
value of any outstanding loans in SILC, we utilise a number of questions which we be-
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lieve to be a good proxy for whether a household has a poor credit record. We determ-
ine a household to be high credit risk if they have had any rent, utilities or consumer
loan arrears in the previous 12 months due to financial difficulties, as these are indicat-
ors of poor repayment history or poor debt management which are likely to be picked
up in a credit bureau check. In addition, households who either state that their exist-
ing debt is a burden or that they are unable to meet an unexpected expense, and also
either face at least 1 deprivation indicator in SILC11 or state that they face difficulties in
making ends meet are determined to be high credit risk. Because whether existing debt
is a burden and whether a household is able to meet an unexpected expense are sub-
jective measures, we cross reference them with the deprivation and making ends meet
measures to ensure that we are capturing households which are facing some material
difficulty as a result. As the households in our sample do not have a mortgage, existing
debt refers to products such as auto loans, credit cards and other consumer loans. If
these households are suffering material hardship due to holding these loans, then we
determine that they are not suitable candidates for mortgage credit at present.
3.2.3 Controlling for Macroprudential Regulations
To determine the level of bankable credit demand, we exclude all households whose
credit risk is high as measured in Section 3.2.2 above. However, the degree to which
households can enter the market given the current regulatory environment depends
on their income and wealth. We therefore need to include these individual character-
istics in any assessment of how many households can pass the regulatory hurdles. To
take these regulations into account, our methodology draws on the framework in Kelly
et al. (2018); we calculate the maximum potential house price a household could afford
under the current market and regulatory conditions. This in turn provides each house-
hold with a maximum loan that they could draw down given the combination of their
own personal circumstances and the prevailing regulatory environment. While there is
an extensive literature on the calibration of macroprudential regulations and the level
at which the specific parameter should be set, we abstract from this debate in our ana-
lysis and accept the current regime as binding. We now outline how we estimate how
much each household can afford to purchase relative to their income, wealth and an
affordability stress test.
11Deprivation indicators include: had to go without heating due to lack of money; deprived of 2 pairs of
shoes; deprived of roast joint of meat (or equivalent) once a week; deprived of meal containing meat, fish,
or vegetarian equivalent every second day; unable to replace worn out clothes with new; unable to afford
warm, waterproof coat; deprived of ability to keep home warm; unable to replace worn out furniture;
deprived of get together with friends or family for drink or meal once a month; unable to buy presents for
family at least once a year; deprived of a social activity in last 2 weeks due to lack of money; at least 1 day
in past 2 weeks where could not have substantial meal due to lack of money.
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3.2.3.1 Do Households Have Sufficient Wealth?
Under the macroprudential mortgage regulations introduced in 2015, first time buy-
ers (FTB) in Ireland are permitted a maximum loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of 90 per cent
(Kinghan, 2018)12, meaning they must make a down-payment of at least 10 per cent of
the value of the property.
One of the limitations of the SILC dataset is that it does not contain any measure
of household wealth which could be used to calculate the size of any potential deposit
the household could make. To the best of our knowledge there are no data on the
wealth of potential first time buyers outside of the 2013 CSO Household Finance and
Consumption Survey (HFCS). Given the major economic challenges faced at that time
in the wake of the financial crisis and the rapid increase in both incomes and asset
prices since 2013 in Ireland, we do not believe the information in this survey is likely
to provide an accurate reflection of the current wealth of potential first time buyers.
Nevertheless, we do make use of these data in a robustness check in Section 4. Our
preferred method is therefore to utilise information on current income and expenditure
to calculate the estimated savings a household might reasonably be expected to accrue
to put towards a down-payment. More specifically, we allow a household to save Sm
each month:
Sm = Ym − Rm − Em
where Ym is net monthly income, Rm is their current monthly rent and Em is their
minimum necessary monthly expenditure. Em is calculated as the higher of either the
minimum the household states they need to make ends meet minus their current rent,
or the Minimum Essential Standard of Living (MESL) income for each household type
defined by the Vincentian Partnership for Social Justice13 plus average childcare costs14
if the household has dependent children. If a household responds that they do not
regularly save any of their income, we let Sm = 0. We cannot observe the precise
amount these households would save in practice. However, these are all households
with a demand for mortgage credit who state they regularly save a portion of their
income, so the assumption that they would save intensively towards a down-payment
does not seem an unreasonable assumption.
In addition to considering how much a household is able to save on a monthly
12At present (December 2019), up to 5 per cent of the value of new FTB lending may exceed the 90 per
cent LTV limit.
13The Minimum Essential Standard of Living (MESL) income measure includes spending on the fol-
lowing items: food, clothing, personal care, healthcare, household goods, household services, commu-
nications, social inclusion, education, transport, household energy, personal costs, insurance, savings and
contingencies.
14We use weekly average childcare costs from the CSO transformed into a monthly figure and updated
to 2017 prices using core CPI.
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basis towards a deposit, another important aspect is whether they are likely to receive
an intergenerational wealth transfer. A 2016 Bank of Ireland survey found that 51 per
cent of prospective borrowers aged 25-45 expected to receive a financial gift towards a
deposit15. We therefore randomly allocate 50 per cent of non high credit risk households
a one-off e10,000 gift. We use e10,000 as up to e10,000 was the modal choice of mature
home-owners providing gifts to children from a recent survey (Corrigan, 2019). As the
size of this gift varies, in Section 4 we examine the sensitivity of our results to changes
in the size of this gift.
Just over half of households in the Bank of Ireland’s recent survey said they had
been saving for 2 years, while in analysis based on a couple with no children and wish-
ing to purchase a 3 bedroom property in 2016, Kelly and McCann (2016) found that the
time required to save for a deposit ranged from less than a year in non-urban areas,
to 1-1.5 years in urban areas excluding Dublin, and 2.5-4 years in Dublin depending
on the area. Using these estimates as a guide, we therefore allow households to save
for 3 years to accumulate a deposit, d, which is a function of their monthly savings Sm
and whether they receive a gift, G. We examine the sensitivity of our estimates to this
parameter choice in Section 4.
d =
(Sm ∗ 12 ∗ 3) + 10, 000 if G = 1Sm ∗ 12 ∗ 3 otherwise









3.2.3.2 Do Households Have Sufficient Gross Income?
First time buyer households are permitted a maximum loan size of 3.5 times their
gross income under current macroprudential regulations. Under this loan-to-income
(LTI) constraint, the maximum house price the household could afford, hplti is:
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where Yg is gross income and d is the deposit they are able to save.
3.2.3.3 Can Households Pass an Affordability Stress Test
In an attempt to ensure the financial stability of both households and the banking
system more generally, mortgage providers in Ireland stress test households to ensure
that they would be able to maintain their mortgage repayments in the event of an in-
crease in interest rates which would result in higher monthly payments. We therefore
calculate the maximum house price a household could afford if interest rates were to






where Pm = Ym − Em is the potential monthly payment (net income minus neces-
sary expenditure), LTV is 90 per cent, rs = r + 2% where r is the prevailing interest rate
on new mortgage loans16, and τ is the mortgage term which is the minimum of either
30 years or the number of years until the household head reaches retirement age.
3.2.4 What is the Maximum House Price Buyers Can Afford?
Having calculated three potential house prices, hpltv, hplti and hpdsr, under the cur-
rent regulatory conditions surrounding wealth, income and affordability, the maximum
priced house a household can afford, hpi is given by:
hp(max)i = min(hpltv, hplti, hpdsr)
Put simply, this ensures the household can only afford the lowest of these three
house prices i.e. it forces the household to have the house price of the factor they are
most constrained by. We determine a household to form part of the bankable demand
and therefore to potentially be able to enter the housing market if:
hp(max)i > hpcp(25)
where hpcp(25) is the house price at the 25th percentile in the household’s county
house price distribution. This condition is necessary to ensure that hpi is actually suffi-
cient to allow the household to purchase a property given current prices. Furthermore,
we use the 25th percentile because Gaffney (2018) shows that the vast majority of sales,
163.6% in 2016 and 3.4% in 2017 from Central Bank of Ireland.
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approximately 95 per cent at the 10th percentile and roughly 80 per cent at the 20th per-
centile of the price distribution, are made by cash buyers and institutional investors,
with very low levels bought by first time buyers. Nonetheless, we examine the sensit-
ivity of our estimates to this assumption in Section 4.
Thinking back to the concept of bankable credit demand established in Section 2.2,
households are excluded if they are either high credit risk, or if the maximum house
price they could afford under the current regulatory conditions would not allow them
to purchase at least the house at the 25th percentile of the price distribution in their
county. All remaining households form part of the estimated bankable credit demand.
3.2.5 Towards a Household Specific Estimate of the House Price
While the above assessment calculates the maximum priced house that a household
could afford to purchase given its level of income and wealth, in practice the purchaser
may not wish to stretch themselves to the absolute maximum. Furthermore, house-
holds naturally choose to purchase different houses depending on their circumstances
and factors such as the location, number of bedrooms, family structure and other char-
acteristics. Rather than forcing all households to purchase the most expensive house
possible, to account for this, we estimate a household specific house price, that varies
according to their characteristics, but is pinned to the average first time buyer house
price in the county in which they are purchasing.
Methodologically we run a hedonic regression using existing mortgaged home-
owner households in SILC controlling for household characteristics such as age, edu-
cation, number of adults and family size:
HVi = β0 + β1Agei + β2HHSize + β3Education + β4Adults + εi (10)
where HVi is the reported value of the current dwelling in SILC provided by the
household. Fahy et al. (2018) and Slaymaker et al. (2019) show this variable to be very
accurate when used to calculate the proportion of households in negative equity. For
each household we then predict an adjusted house price given these characteristics.
Taking the average of these predicted values, and calculating the deviation of each
household to the average, we then obtain a household specific adjustment to the over-
all average, and this adjustment is applied to the actual new market average first time
buyer house price from the Central Statistics Office. We then allow the household to
transact at this value if it is less than or equal to hp(max)i i.e. the house price becomes
the following: hp = min(hp(max)i, adjusted county FTB price). The required loan is
equal to hp − d i.e. we do not force the LTV to be 90 per cent. This means that while
hp(max)i is the maximum house price each household can face, we do not force them to
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purchase this maximum priced house, and instead allocate them their household spe-
cific adjusted county FTB price if this is lower. In other words, if hp(max)i is very high,
it moderates this. This has no impact on the number of households able to transact,
but simply adjusts the house price and loan size of those who are able to transact. This
gives an average loan ofe208,000. The actual mean FTB loan size in 2017 wase206,000.
3.3 What Share of Households Have Bankable Credit Demand?
We present the results of our assessment in Table 6. Overall, we see that 82 per cent of
our sample of renting households with an underlying demand for mortgage credit do
not have bankable demand. Regarding the decomposition into credit risk and income
and wealth channels, 65 per cent of the overall sample are high credit risk. 70 per cent of
households have insufficient wealth (that is, are LTV constrained), while, on the other
hand, approximately only half as many households have insufficient gross income or
fail affordability stress tests. In column 2 of Table 6 we focus purely on households
who are not high credit risk. Of these, we see that nearly half are nevertheless outside
bankable demand. The majority of these are LTV constrained (45 per cent), with only
approximately 20 per cent of these households constrained by LTI or affordability stress
constraints.
As explained in Section 3.2.2, we calculate three potential house prices, hpltv, hplti
and hpdsr, and the minimum of these is the maximum potential house price a house-
hold could afford to purchase. In Table 7 we show the proportion of households for
which maximum house price is determined by the LTV, LTI and affordability condi-
tions. While Table 6 shows that LTV constraints are crucial in terms of whether a house-
hold is credit constrained or not, from Table 7 it is clear that for non high credit risk
households, the 3.5 loan-to-income condition is the most likely to be limiting the max-
imum house price they could afford. This illustrates the dual challenges faced by many
prospective home-owners; the majority face difficulties in raising a sufficient down-
payment, while many of those able to overcome that hurdle are then faced with con-
straints on the amount they are able to borrow due to their income.
One of the most striking inferences from Table 6 is that more than four fifths of
Table 6. Mortgage Credit Access and Bankable Demand
% of all with mortgage % of non high
credit demand credit risk
High credit risk households 65.03 -
Insufficient down-payment 70.62 45.35
Insufficient Income 36.90 23.33
Fail affordability stress test 36.14 20.04
Excluded Share of Mortgage Demand 82.41 49.70
No. Obs 897 303
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Table 7. Is the maximum potential house price determined by down-payment, income or affordability?
% of all with mortgage % of non high
credit demand credit risk
Down-payment channel 55.84 41.48
Income channel 23.75 45.04
Affordability stress channel 20.41 13.48
No. Obs 897 303
our sample are not part of the bankable demand concept discussed in Section 2.2.
From Table 8 we see that these bankable demand households are high income house-
holds, with a mean gross income of e87,000 compared to e51,500 for those in the non-
bankable demand group. It is also interesting to note that on average they are cur-
rently paying approximately 20 per cent of their net income on their rental payments
compared to nearly 28 per cent for non-bankable households. This highlights the diffi-
culties faced by these households; they are not suitable candidates for mortgage credit,
yet they face paying a substantial portion of their income on rental payments. It is also
important to remember that the sample on which this analysis is based is not a repres-
entation of the entire rental sector, but of the roughly 40 per cent with an underlying
demand for mortgage credit. This therefore excludes many of the lower income house-
holds and many of those living in local authority rental accommodation for example.
This highlights the need for affordable, alternative tenures for those not eligible for
mortgage credit.
Table 8. Bankable v Non-bankable demand
Bankable Non-bankable
Mean gross income (e) 87,039 51,549
Mean rent-to-income ratio 0.1969 0.2770
No. Obs 152 745
Rent-to-income ratios are based on net income.
3.4 Towards an Aggregate Measure of Bankable Credit and A Comparison
to Actual Lending
In this section, we use the household micro-data-based market segmentation above to
provide an aggregate measure of bankable credit. We then compare the bankable credit
to actual lending in the market to explore if a credit gap exists in Ireland at present.
In order to estimate the aggregate credit requirement, we focus on the 18 per cent
of households in our sample who we find are not excluded by credit risk or the regu-
latory environment. Using the survey weights in SILC as a grossing factor enables us
to estimate the number of potential FTB households across Ireland who have bankable
credit demand according to the criteria we use. Applying the weights to our sample
provides an underlying number of 38,171 households per annum, with an implied
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value of e7.9bn. It must be noted that these figures represent the stock of latent mort-
gage demand in the population and do not imply that this level of flow of new lending
could occur on an annualised basis. Indeed there could be a considerable difference
between the degree to which aspiration to own housing translates into active mortgage
demand. Naturally, as some households get allocated credit the share in the popula-
tion that wish to transition may fall over time in Ireland given the likely high level of
pent up demand at present due to the low supply and high credit access hurdles. There
would also be a replacement to the pent up demand as new households are formed
(by natural increase or migration) and enter the rental market with a latent mortgage
demand.
To provide some context, we compare the estimated stock of bankable demand to
the actual level of mortgage approvals that the Banking and Payments Federation re-
ported across 2016 and 2017 (on average for comparison purposes). We choose mort-
gage approvals as we are making no assumptions in our latent demand assessment
about whether households can actually find an adequate house, close the sale and draw
down the funds. Given the large gap between approvals and draw-downs in Ireland
at present, this difference could be sizeable. On average across 2016 and 2017, total
mortgage approvals in Ireland were 19,477 which is 18,171 lower than the estimate of
bankable demand in terms of the number of loans. In value terms, e4bn of first time
buyer loans were approved on average across 2016 and 2017 which is e3.9bn lower
than the bankable demand level.
Table 9. Estimated Stock of Bankable Demand from Renters and Comparison to Actual Lending
Aggregate Stock of Bankable Demand
% bankable credit demand 17.59
Implied No. Loans (Annualised) 38,171
Implied Value of Loans (ebn, Annualised) 7.9
Comparison to Actual Lending
Implied no. Loans 38,171
BPFI actual no. approvals 19,477
Difference 18,694
Implied value of Loans (ebn) 7.9
BPFI actual value of approvals (ebn) 4.0
Difference (ebn) 3.9
Notes: In SILC we pool 2016 &2017 data. We therefore divide estimates by 2 to obtain annual figures.
In one sense, this comparison is potentially misleading as it compares the stock of
households with mortgage demand, with the flow of households obtaining new mort-
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gage approvals. In any one specific year, it is not likely that all households with a latent
demand for credit will activate a credit process or come forward to service that demand.
This is particularly likely to be the case here as our measure of latent credit demand is
drawn from a measure which asks households if they are intending to buy a property
within the next two years. To provide an accurate measure of the annual credit gap, we
need to address this issue. Our approach to deal with this consideration, is to vary the
rate at which the latent credit demand comes forward into realised credit demand on
an annual basis.
To calibrate the level of realised credit demand, we provide three scenarios in addi-
tion to the total bankable credit demand. As a baseline estimate we use the application
rate of households with mortgage demand in the Economic Survey Monitor and apply
this to our expanded group of households; this application rate is 30 per cent. As a high
scenario, we make the simplifying assumption that, given our credit demand estimate
is over a two year period, half of the households come forward in each year which
provides a 50 per cent flow rate. We also provide a low scenario which considers a 10
per cent demand flow rate. Using these scenarios, we estimate that between 2,000 and
9,000 new loans could be approved at a value of between e0.4bn and e1.9bn. The me-
dium, baseline scenario suggests approximately 5,600 new loans are required at a value
of e1.2bn per annum. This is evidence of a considerable credit supply under-provision
in the Irish market relative to the demographic demand.
Table 10. Towards a Flow Estimate of the Annual Credit Gap
Scenario Low Medium High
Demand Flow Rate 10% 30% 50%
Implied Additional Loans 1869 5608 9347
Actual Flow 19477 19477 19477
Total Flow of Latent Demand (Loans) 21346 25085 28824
Implied Additional Value Loans (ebn) 0.39 1.17 1.95
Actual Value Flow (ebn) 3.95 3.95 3.95
Total Flow of Latent Demand (Value ebn) 4.3 5.1 5.9
Implied Loan Drawdowns (at 80% rate17) 17,248 20,269 23,290
Implied Value Drawdowns 3.4 4.0 4.6
While at first glance these estimates may seem sizeable in terms of the percentage
increase in credit, it is helpful to put them into context. In Table 11 we provide a com-
parison between our 2016/17 figures and 2006 in the height of the boom period. From
the BPFI data we know that in 2016/17 there were 19,500 FTB loan approvals on aver-
age per year, with 15,700 FTB mortgages actually drawn down; roughly an 80 per cent
ratio between approvals and draw-downs. If we add our estimates of loans to the ac-
tual data for each scenario, we can approximate the level of draw-downs that would be
implied in each scenario. These data are presented in Table 10 and Figure 3. In Table 11,
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Figure 3. Scenarios for Credit Gap
(a) Number of Loans (b) Loan Value (ebn)
Table 11. Comparison of Mortgage Drawdowns and Population Size between 2016/17 and 2006
Drawdowns Number of Households Population % of Households % of Population
Demand Flow Rate
Low (10%) 17,248 2,003,645 4,761,865 0.9% 0.36%
Medium (30%) 20,269 2,003,645 4,761,865 1.0% 0.43%
High (50%) 23,290 2,003,645 4,761,865 1.2% 0.49%
2006 - Credit Boom 37,064 1,769,613 4,239,848 2.1% 0.87%
Source: 2006 & 2016 Census.
we compare the levels of implied draw-downs as a percentage of households and of the
population (from the 2016 Census) to the position in 2006 at the height of the unsustain-
able credit boom. We see that this actually amounts to 14,000 fewer loans per year in
the high (50 per cent demand flow rate) scenario, and 17,000 fewer loans per year in
the 30 per cent baseline scenario, compared to in the boom of 2006. This is despite the
fact that Census figures show that the population has increased by 0.5 million people
in that time, an increase of 234,000 households.
At this point it is important to provide some further context to these findings. These
estimates are based on households currently in the rental sector. However, in practice,
first time home buyers are not only drawn from the rental sector, but also from those
continuing to live with parents or family while trying to save for a down-payment, as
well as a likely smaller number of households migrating to Ireland. These estimates of
excess demand for mortgage credit among current renters are therefore likely to under-
estimate the true overall level of demand and can therefore be thought of as a lower
bound of the excess demand for mortgage credit of all potential first time buyers.
4 Sensitivity
Microsimulation models such as the one presented in this paper require a series of
assumptions around the parameterisation of particular variables. In Section 3 we docu-
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mented the assumptions made, which were informed by prior research. In this section
we examine the sensitivity of our estimates to the parameters chosen. Specifically, we
focus on how changing the following affects the estimates: the length of time borrow-
ers are permitted to save for a down-payment; the initial wealth levels of borrowers;
the minimum house price borrowers are permitted to purchase; and the size of any
intergenerational gift towards down-payment. We will now discuss each of these in
turn.
Table 12. Sensitivity Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline 2 yrs saving HFCS wealth hp p(10) Gift e5000 Gift e15000
% Households:
High Credit Risk 65.03 65.03 65.03 65.03 65.03 65.03
Insufficient Down-payment 70.62 72.43 61.09 64.61 74.48 66
Insufficient Income 36.9 37.13 35.88 22.46 37.04 36.64
Fail Affordability Stress Test 36.14 36.14 36.02 30.34 36.14 36.14
Overall Non-bankable 82.41 83.08 79.53 79.1 83.75 80.8
Stock of Bankable Demand
Bankable 17.59 16.92 20.47 20.9 16.25 19.2
Implied no. loans (Annualised) 38171 36697 44454 45362 35284 41656
Implied value loans (Annualised) 7.9 8.2 8.55 8.8 7.55 8.4
Flow of Bankable Demand
Implied additional no. loans
10% 1869 1722 2498 2589 1581 2218
30% 5608 5166 7493 7766 4742 6654
50% 9347 8610 12489 12943 7904 11090
Implied additional value loans (ebn)
10% 0.39 0.42 0.46 0.48 0.36 0.44
30% 1.17 1.26 1.37 1.44 1.07 1.32
50% 1.95 2.10 2.28 2.40 1.78 2.20
Length of Time Permitted to Save for Down-payment
In our baseline estimates presented in Section 3, we allowed households to accu-
mulate a down-payment by saving their income remaining each month after making
rental payments and covering minimum necessary expenditures for 3 years. We chose
this baseline of 3 years because it falls within Kelly and McCann’s (2016) estimated
range of 2.5-4 years for Dublin, depending on the area, and because previous research
shows potential first time buyers in urban areas, particularly in and around Dublin,
face the most acute affordability challenges (Allen-Coghlan et al., 2019). Nevertheless,
we would expect our estimates to be somewhat sensitive to this choice and it is there-
fore important to examine how sensitive our estimates are to this parameter. For areas
outside of Dublin, Kelly and McCann (2016) find that the time required to save for a
deposit ranges up to 1.5 years. As a sensitivity check, we therefore reduce the time
allowed to accrue a down-payment from 3 to 2 years.
The results are presented in column 2 of Table 12. The baseline estimates are re-
ported in column 1 for ease of comparison. Unsurprisingly, reducing the length of time
borrowers save for a deposit increases the proportion of households with an insufficient
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down-payment, although at 2 percentage points, the magnitude of the increase is rel-
atively small. An increase in the number of households unable to meet LTV conditions
therefore reduces the level of bankable demand, as this refers to the level of demand
that could be serviced at present given current credit and macroprudential conditions.
The effect on the overall proportion of the sample with bankable demand is even smal-
ler than on the proportion of households unable to meet LTV conditions, falling from
17.6 to 16.9 per cent. In terms of loans, using the middle 30 per cent credit realisation
scenario, this would reduce the estimate of the credit gap by 450 loans per year. This
fall in the credit gap may at first appear counter-intuitive, but it happens because we
only classify those with sufficient savings (can meet the LTV condition) as having bank-
able demand and therefore in the gap. If we reduce the amount of savings households
accumulate by lowering the savings time, the share of households with LTV constraints
increases which reduces the share with bankable demand and the credit gap therefore
declines.
Initial Household Wealth
As discussed in Section 3.2.3, one of the major challenges in this research is how
to estimate the size of a household’s potential down-payment, given the lack of house-
hold wealth information in SILC. As a consequence of this, in our baseline model, our
preferred approach was to utilise information on current income and expenditure to
calculate the estimated savings a household might reasonably be expected to accrue
to put towards a down-payment. The drawback of this method is that it assumes all
households start from a position of zero wealth, which is obviously unrealistic. An
alternative to this is to use data from the 2013 Household Finance and Consumption
Survey (HFCS). There are a number of points to note with these data. First, given the
state of the Irish economy in 2013 coupled with the rapid increase in both incomes and
asset prices since then, we believe these data are likely to be out of date and unlikely
to provide an accurate reflection of the current wealth of potential first time buyers.
Second, we are unable to distinguish between rental households actively preparing to
become home-owners and those with no immediate demand to do so; we would expect
their savings levels to differ. Third, the HFCS data give a one-off snapshot of household
wealth, with no indication of if and how long a household may have been saving for.
As our credit demand variable relates to intending to buy within the next two years,
rather than now, this distinction is important.
However to address this consideration, as a robustness check, we combine our ap-
proach of utilising information on current income and expenditure to calculate the es-
timated savings a household might reasonably be expected to accrue, with increasing
their initial wealth level using data from the HFCS. The results are presented in column
3 of Table 12. The proportion of down-payment constrained borrowers falls by nearly
10 percentage points to 61 per cent, while the overall share with bankable demand rises
3 percentage points to 20.5 per cent. In terms of loans, using the middle 30 per cent
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credit realisation scenario, this would increase the estimate of the credit gap by nearly
1900 loans per year. However, given this approach both provides households with an
initial level of wealth yet also allows them to further add to their savings for 3 years, the
estimates are therefore likely to be an overestimate of the size of the serviceable credit
gap and must be treated with caution. Nonetheless they provide a useful comparison
with the baseline estimates. There are pros and cons to both our baseline model ap-
proach and the sensitivity check using the HFCS data. On balance, our baseline method
of utilising information on current income and expenditure to calculate the estimated
savings a household might reasonably be expected to accrue remains our preferred spe-
cification.
Minimum House Price - altering p(25)
In our baseline model, we allow a household to be considered as having bankable
credit demand provided the minimum priced house they can afford is at or above the
25th percentile house price in their county. This entry point is crucial as it connects what
the household can afford to current market prices. The 25th percentile of the house price
distribution was chosen because Gaffney (2018) shows that the vast majority of sales,
approximately 95 per cent at the 10th percentile and roughly 80 per cent at the 20th per-
centile of the price distribution, are made by cash buyers and institutional investors,
with very low levels bought by first time buyers. Furthermore, the house price distri-
bution contains all property types and it is therefore likely that properties sold below
that point may well be smaller properties such as one bedroom apartments. This would
be consistent with Gaffney (2018) who finds that the vast majority of transactions below
the twentieth percentile are by cash buyers and institutional investors; many of these
are likely to be for properties in the rental market, rather than transactions by owner
occupiers.
On the other hand, it could be argued that one of the reasons virtually no first time
buyers are purchasing properties at the tenth percentile of the property price distribu-
tion is because currently only households towards the higher end of the income dis-
tribution are receiving mortgage credit (Lydon and McCann, 2017). If a greater num-
ber of households from further down the income distribution were to enter the home-
ownership market, we may expect this to change over time. We therefore provide a
sensitivity check in column 4 of Table 12, where we lower the house price threshold to
the tenth percentile, i.e. we consider a household to have bankable demand if:
hp(max)i > hpcp(10)
This substantially reduces the share of households with insufficient income, a fall of
15 percentage points, as well as reducing the shares with an insufficient down-payment
and those who would fail an affordability stress test. In terms of the estimate of the
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credit gap, using the middle 30 per cent credit realisation scenario, this would increase
the estimate of the credit gap by more than 2000 loans per year. While this is a sizeable
increase, opening up an additional 15 per cent of the property price distribution is also
a large change to the model.
At this juncture it is important to re-emphasise that the analysis in this paper refers
solely to credit demand and those who could be approved for credit, not whether there
would be sufficient housing supply to allow households to convert a credit approval
into actually drawing down the credit and purchasing a property. Nevertheless, it is
important to consider how realistic this lowering of the house price threshold para-
meter is. The tenth percentile house prices for each county are reported in Table 15.
Taking Dublin as an example, the tenth percentile property price was e172,500 in 2016,
rising to e200,000 in 2017. This raises questions as to whether this demand can really
be considered serviceable or bankable demand. Our findings suggest that the choice
of this entry point is important. On balance, we prefer the more conservative baseline
model estimates.
Gift Size
The final sensitivity check we perform is to vary the size of the intergenerational
wealth transfer, or family gift. In the baseline model we assumed a gift size of e10,000.
This choice of gift was motivated by the initial findings of a Department of Housing,
Local Government and Heritage survey of mature home-owners (Corrigan, 2019). Re-
spondents were asked whether they gave each child a gift towards a down-payment
for a property and if so what the value of the gift was (in bands). Of those who did
provide a gift, the modal response was up to e10,000, although there were some con-
siderably larger gifts. To test the sensitivity of our estimates to the gift size, in column 5
we decrease this to e5,000, while in column 6 we instead increase it to e15,000. Using
the middle 30 per cent credit realisation scenario, reducing the size of the gift would
reduce the estimated credit gap by 850 loans per year, while increasing the gift would
increase the gap by 1050 loans.
Overall, it is clear that the precise magnitude of our estimates is sensitive to the
parameters chosen and assumptions made. Nonetheless, what is consistently clear un-
der all scenarios is that there is a substantial unmet demand for mortgage credit under
current credit conditions for first time buyers in the Irish economy.
5 What Role Could State Supports Play in Aiding Access to
Credit?
To this point, we have demonstrated that there is considerable latent underlying de-
mand for credit in the Irish mortgage market that is unserviced at present. While there
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are various reasons for this, it is likely this gap can be linked to both demand and
supply side market failures which are capping credit flows. On the demand side, we
have demonstrated that potential first time buyers suffer from three types of constraint:
down-payment, income and affordability. In this section, we explore whether State
mortgage supports could be used to address a portion of this credit gap and unlock
some of the underlying latent demand. Specifically, we look at the direct provision of
mortgage credit which aims to remove the income and affordability constraints.
In February 2018 the Irish government launched the Rebuilding Ireland Home Loan
(RIHL), a government backed scheme which directly provides mortgage credit for eli-
gible low to middle income first time buyers available through local authorities. In this
section we undertake a microsimulation exercise which deploys the conditions of this
direct mortgage credit provision RIHL scheme to examine what proportion of rental
households with an underlying demand for mortgage credit would be eligible to enter
the home-ownership market through the RIHL scheme.
Under this scheme potential home-owners can borrow up to 90 per cent of the mar-
ket value of the property, up to maximum market values of e320,000 in Dublin, Wick-
low, Meath, Louth, Kildare, Cork and Galway, and e250,000 elsewhere. Borrowers
have a choice of three rate products (exclusive of mortgage protection insurance): 2 per
cent fixed for up to 25 years; 2.25 per cent fixed for up to 30 years; 2.30 per cent vari-
able for up to 30 years. In order to be eligible for RIHL, potential home-owners must
satisfy the following criteria: be aged 18-70; have annual gross income not to exceed
e50,000 (e75,000) for single person (couple); have been in continuous employment for
a minimum of two years; consent to an Irish Credit Bureau check; purchase or build a
property of no more than 175 m2; and be able to provide evidence of insufficient offers
of finance from 2 banks/building societies.
At this juncture it is useful to consider which groups of households may be eligible
for RIHL, relative to those contained in our analysis of the credit gap presented so far in
this paper. To do this, in Figure 4 we provide a visual overview of the different groups
in the model. Beginning with all households with mortgage demand, these are then
categorised as either 1) bankable demand; 2) constrained by current credit and mac-
roprudential conditions (either LTV, LTI or affordability conditions); or 3) high credit
risk. Our measure of the credit gap concerns only those adjudged to have bankable de-
mand for credit. On the other hand, RIHL aims to loosen both the LTI and affordability
credit constraint factors relative to the current market and regulatory conditions used
in Section 3.2.2. There is no loan-to-income limit and as two fixed rate interest rates are
offered for the duration of the mortgage term, this means that an affordability stress
test to account for potential interest rate rises is no longer required.
There is no change to the wealth requirements as potential borrowers are still ex-
pected to make a minimum 10 per cent down-payment under RIHL, so those who faced
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LTV or down-payment constraints will not be eligible for RIHL. Similarly, households
have to undergo an Irish Credit Bureau check. In practice it is possible that this could be
a less stringent credit risk assessment than the one applied by the banking sector. How-
ever, for the purposes of this study we therefore apply the same credit risk criteria that
we applied under current market conditions in Section 3.2.2. This means that house-
holds assessed to be high credit risk in Section 3.2.2 remain so in our RIHL analysis.
Overall, we therefore see from Figure 4 that households potentially eligible for RIHL
come from both the bankable demand group and those who may have been constrained
by LTI and affordability constraints under current credit conditions. Furthermore, not
all households with bankable demand will be eligible for RIHL, some will not meet the
maximum income thresholds for example. It is therefore important to highlight that
the group of households eligible for RIHL will not simply be a subset of those with
bankable demand.
In practice, in our microsimulation exercise we apply the following conditions.
We determine a household to be eligible for RIHL if they are: aged 18-70; are cur-
rently in employment and have not had any spells of unemployment in the previous
12 months18; have a maximum annual gross income not exceeding e50,000 (e75,000)
for a single person (couple). In addition, we exclude households we determined to be
high credit risk according to the method discussed in Section 3.2.2: households with
any rent, utilities or consumer loan arrears in the previous 12 months due to financial
difficulties; households who either state that their existing debt is a burden or that they
are unable to meet an unexpected expense, and also either face at least 1 deprivation
indicator in SILC or state that they face difficulties in making ends meet are determined
18Unfortunately in the data we only have this information for the previous 12 months, rather than 2
years. Nevertheless, we believe this is likely to be a good proxy.
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to be high credit risk. We exclude these households as these measures are indicators of
poor repayment history or poor debt management which are likely to be picked up in
the credit bureau check required to determine RIHL eligibility. We also apply a max-
imum debt-service-to-income ratio of 35 per cent which can only be breached in 10 per
cent of cases as per the RIHL credit policy. We do not adjust the interest rate to include
the cost of mortgage insurance which is outside the scope of this research.19
As the LTV condition remains, we allow the household to purchase a house priced
hpltv, as calculated above. We then apply a modified affordability stress constraint to
ensure that a household could meet the prospective monthly mortgage payment and
meet their minimum necessary expenditure:
Paymentm = LTV ∗ hpltv ∗
r(1 + r)τ
((1 + r)τ)− 1
Ym − Paymentm > Em
where LTV is 90 per cent, r=2.25 per cent fixed rate and τ = min(30 years, years til
retirement)20. A household would be eligible for RIHL as long as they would be able to
meet their necessary expenditure after paying this prospective mortgage payment.
Table 13. Estimated RIHL Eligibility
Demand Flow Rate 10% 30% 50%
Implied RIHL Loan Numbers 1,163 3,489 5,815
Implied Additional Value Loans (ebn) 0.20 0.59 0.98
Implied RIHL Drawdowns 930 2,791 4,652
Implied Value of Drawdowns 0.156 0.468 0.78
We present the findings of this microsimulation exercise in Table 13. Our estimates
show that, depending on the demand flow rate, between 1,163 and 5,815 households
could be eligible for RIHL on an annual basis, with a total implied loan value of between
e0.2 billion and e0.98 billion. In order to estimate the total value associated with this
number of loans, we cap the maximum loan the household could receive at 90 per cent
of maximum market values allowed under RIHL: e320,000 in Dublin, Wicklow, Meath,
Louth, Kildare, Cork and Galway, and e250,000 elsewhere.
It is useful to compare the relative magnitude of the estimated potential RIHL in-
19Mortgage Protection Insurance (MPI) is compulsory for local authority borrowers at a rate of 0.555
percentage points which operationalises as an increase in the interest rate. We do not include this in our
analysis as we do not account for insurance costs in our research.
20We allow τ = year til retirement as long as this is at least 25 years; the minimum fixed rate term under
RIHL.
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tervention with the size of the estimated credit gap. However, at this juncture it is im-
portant to reiterate that households eligible for RIHL are not simply a subset of those
with credit demand. Rather, RIHL will include some households who have bankable
demand i.e. part of the credit gap, as well as some currently constrained by LTI and
affordability conditions, which RIHL loosens (see Figure 4). Nevertheless, our estim-
ates indicate that RIHL could potentially aid credit access equivalent to roughly half
the amount of the credit gap21. However, it is important to note that we are not able
to observe in our data whether a household has received two loan rejections or insuffi-
cient offers of mortgage credit from the banking sector; one of the criteria for receiving
a RIHL loan. These estimates must therefore be thought of as an upper bound of the
portion of the credit gap that could be addressed by RIHL. It is interesting to note that
the vast majority of the households who are eligible for RIHL in our sample come from
the group who make up bankable demand. In reality, relatively few of the 82 per cent
of households we find to have insufficient wealth or income in Table 6 are only LTI
or affordability stress constrained and therefore potentially eligible for RIHL. This is
unsurprising given that in Table 6 we showed that 70 per cent of households had in-
sufficient deposits. Put simply, an intervention such as RIHL will have little impact
on reducing the overall proportion of credit constrained households because it still re-
quires households to be able to put down a sufficient down-payment.
Table 14 provides a comparison between households who are eligible for RIHL and
the portion of bankable demand households not eligible for a RIHL loan. From this we
see that RIHL is, as we would expect, targeted at households lower down the income
distribution, with a mean gross income of roughly e58,000 compared to e98,000 for
those with bankable demand who are not eligible. Similarly, the mean loan sizes and
house prices are substantially lower for the RIHL eligible group, with a mean house
price of roughly e200,000 compared to e320,000 for those not eligible for RIHL. Inter-
estingly, allowing these RIHL eligible households to enter the home-ownership market
would lower their housing payment to income ratio from about 22 per cent to just un-
der 20 per cent. It must be noted that our sample sizes for these splits are usable but
relatively small. Therefore these figures may not be representative in a broader sense.
Table 14. A Comparison between RIHL eligible and Bankable but non RIHL eligible households
RIHL eligible Bankable - not
RIHL eligible
Mean gross income (e) 57,602 97,791
Mean loan size (e) 167,524 226,817
Mean house price (e) 198,086 318,903
Mean mortgage payment to net income ratio 0.1993 0.2096
Mean current rent to net income ratio 0.2235 0.1915
2160 per cent in terms of number of loans and 50 per cent in terms of value.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we use two separate micro-datasets to estimate credit demand and credit
access for Irish first time buyer households. Exploiting individual survey responses to
credit demand questions, and characteristics of the household, we estimate the level of
latent credit demand that could be serviced by the market given prudent credit risk as-
sessment and the current regulatory environment. We then explore the degree to which
policy can help improve credit access by addressing the market failures and servicing
some latent credit demand. In particular we focus on public mortgage provision as an
instrument.
Our research has three main steps. First, we present a conceptual framework for
measuring latent demand under prudential credit risk assessment and macroprudential
regulation by introducing a concept entitled “bankable demand”. We then apply this
framework to data for Ireland using two complementary micro-datasets. Finally, we
approximate the credit gap by comparing our estimates to market lending.
We find a sizeable unmet credit demand amongst Irish rental households, when
those who would not meet credit risk assessment or comply with market regulations
are excluded. In terms of credit access issues, we find insufficient savings for a down-
payment to be the most critical factor relative to income or affordability constraints.
We also find a role for a public mortgage credit instrument to aid access to credit and
alleviate a portion of the gap.
Several potential research extensions are possible. Firstly, this paper does not seek
to estimate the level of bankable credit demand among those aspirant first time buyers
who are living with their parents or other family. In a recent survey of renters Corrigan,
Cotter and Hussey (2019) found a relatively large proportion (almost 31 per cent) of
respondents living with family and considered that this may, in part, be a response
to price inflation in rental markets and may also be the result of individuals seeking
to maximise deposit savings. Exploring the level of mortgage credit demand among
adults living with family could help to further inform estimation of the mortgage credit
gap.
Secondly, the techniques applied in this paper could be deployed to examine the po-
tential impact of rental affordability measures on the capacity of households to achieve
home-ownership. The relatively high market rents paid by some households undoubtedly
inhibit such households from overcoming the LTV constraint, as their potential to save
for a deposit is eroded by high rents. Often, public policy mechanisms to subsidise
rents, such as affordability or cost rental measures, are viewed as tenure end-points
for recipient households, however such measures may provide a platform by which
recipient households accumulate a deposit and become home-owners. Exploring the
dynamics of affordability and tenure choice could provide useful insights for the calib-
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ration of housing affordability and related policy interventions.
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Appendix
Table 15. Tenth Percentile House Prices by County - 2016 & 2017
County 10th Percentile House Price 10th Percentile House Price




































Figure 5. Visual Overview of Microsimulation Model
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